Repercussions of Imperial German Conservatism

I submitted the following essay as my senior thesis in 2011. I wrote it in about 48 hours on a meth binge, and originally submitted it in the body of an email to my professor instead of a word doc. In a meth-induced stupor, I over-utilized an online thesaurus to a nauseating degree, and the result was rather wordy. It’s plagued my writing style ever since. I received a C grade on the thesis, which was probably out of pity since my professor was aware that I struggled with a heroin addiction. Despite being submitted a day late and not in the correct format, my professor showed me mercy. I’m sure many of you won’t find this interesting, but for the few that might, enjoy.

Repercussions Of Imperial German Conservatism:

  A Blueprint For Future Political Extremism, Or The Impending Nazi Inception?

        A multiplicity of historians and political theorists have put a vast amount of effort into contemplating the origins of German Fascism, but more precisely, the particular circumstances of Germany’s cultural and political climate that allowed such an atrocious, yet domestically popular regime to ascend to power. Several theories exist that attempt to explain the triumph of Adolf Hitler’s political extremism, yet in order to even somewhat fathom the conditions that allowed the Nazi Party to obtain control of Germany, the nation’s history must be dissected with the understanding that there is not one explicit answer. The plethora of dedication in conceiving the actions of Nazi Germany, actions that may define the pinnacle of barbarity within human history, have naturally garnered a fierce debate over the origins of such a cumbersome subject, yet uniform theories have developed amongst some historians. Following World War II, a handful of scholars had formed concepts under the Sonderweg theory, which proclaimed that Germany was on a calamitous path due to its cultural and political contrast from the rest of Europe. By the 1960’s, prominent historians magnified this notion, stating that a brutal totalitarian regime was simply unavoidable in the course of German history. A more definitive perception of Sonderweg can be attained through the examination of German politics, which were indeed irregular from the rest of the continent during the Imperial and Wilhelmine period. In other words, Germany’s haphazard transition into modernity, along with it’s lack of embracement for democratic values, sent the nation adrift from the more liberal path it’s neighbors followed. In addition, Sonderweg is accurate in declaring that the German Empire’s failure in adopting Democracy may have had substantial influence over the instability of the Weimar Republic. These unusual occurrences were a result of the nation’s eccentric political culture, which was defined by an extraordinary Conservatism that ensured an unconventional historic narrative for Germany. Regardless of this conviction, it is still irrational to argue that the idiosyncrasies of Imperial Germany, as well as its hyper conservative atmosphere, laid the tracks in the inevitable direction of Nazism. Hitler’s diabolic eccentricity, the devastating aftermath of World War I, and the callous desperation that followed the Depression of the 1930’s, were all undeniable components of the environment that bore the Nazi Regime. No component can solely hold credit in this perfect storm of unfortunate certainties. However, an understanding of the extremity adopted by the political Right, as well as it’s use of fear mongering and deceit, will convincingly reveal the significance of German Conservatism with the Nazi’s rise to power. 

            In regards to National Socialism’s ability to successfully establish control over German politics, one cannot ignore the political history of radical and nationalistic conservatism during the Imperial period. Although Germany’s political history of traditional conservatism and demagogy cannot hold exclusive responsibility for the rise of Fascism, one can only conclude that the evolution of the German right played a significant role in laying a comfortable foundation for a radical dictatorship. Nonetheless, the claim that Nazism was inescapable from the course of history is overly confident. However, the inception of the Third Reich is still conceivable when reviewing “Old” and “New” German Conservatism, especially due to their emphasis on Authoritarianism and it’s relationship with national identity. This notion can be further understood by scrutinizing the political environment of Imperial and Wilhelmine Germany. Fervent nationalism, anti-Semitism, and authoritarianism, all became strong appendages of the Conservative culture which came to dominate Imperial German politics. They were also key aspects of Hitler’s domestic platform, thus suggesting a correlation between his rise to power and the tradition of radicalism in German political culture. This radicalism and preference for Authoritative rule prevented a tangible progression towards democratic modernity. While these factors could support the idea of a pseudo-Fascist destiny for the German nation, external matters remain necessary in determining the unimaginable events of the 20th century. Despite the fact that of all nations where dictatorships rose in the 20th century, Germany was the strongest economically and militarily, the sheer magnitude of destruction caused by the Nazi Regime was not an impending doom for humanity. In spite of this, one could say that it was the (not so) perfect place and perfect time for a crazed despot to appear on the political scene of a disheveled nation. A disheveled nation that, due to it’s history of authoritative control, demagoguery, and emphasis for radical nationalism built upon racial lines, spawned this very despot and forged a convenient grounding for his autocratic regime. 

          What exactly was the state of Conservative politics in 19th century Germany, and what made it distinct from Great Britain and France? It may be easier to contemplate this scenario by acknowledging this important concept: The traditional German, or at this point in history, Prussian, conservatives were not incredibly different from the traditional conservatives of Western Europe. Yes, there were unique political qualities to this group of Prussian elites, but what made them most unique was their ability to retain power into the 20th century. In other words, the Conservative elites of Great Britain and France were greatly suppressed in the 19th century, not only by the general population’s demand for liberal democracy, but also the rise in power of the Bourgeoisie. Germany took a much different path, with traditional Conservatism dominating politics up until World War I. This does not translate into Germany’s inability to industrialize, nor does it imply Germany’s shortcomings in establishing a constitution and universal suffrage. The Imperial Government, with admirable success, designed a complete facade of Democracy in that the electoral system was rigged in the favor of Prussian Junkers. In fact, no administrative measure could be passed in the Bundesrat without the Prussian vote, and to no surprise, the Bundesrat was dominated by the Conservative Right. This Oligarchy in the disguise of Liberal Democracy was what allowed the German Right to prevail over Imperial politics into the modern era. Bismarck even passed the first legislation in Europe that could be considered policies of a Welfare State, but these quasi-socialist programs did little to actually help the lower class. Once again, this was trickery at play, with Bismarck’s true intentions having little to do with helping his people and more to do with undermining the Communist enemy. 

        Considering this information, James Retallack’s claim that political dishonesty was an integral part of Imperial Germany is beyond imaginable. But what does this material suggest in terms of a relationship between the German Empire and the Nazi Regime? German historian Dirk Stegmann argues that several of the parties within the umbrella of German Conservatism can be considered pre or proto-Fascist. Reasons such as the ample use of propaganda, or the cries for radical Nationalism in the name of preserving German culture, come into play. However, German historian Heinz Hagenlucke argues that in no way could these parties be considered pre-Fascist, for reasons such as their lack of great orators and the absence of using violence to meet political ends. Both of these arguments have their merits, but when appraising German Conservatism as a whole, the link between Imperial Germany and Nazism is somewhat visible. Consider the idea of German Conservatism evolving through the late 19th century, adjusting to a modern political system, and using the progressive tools of this new system to acquire backwards goals. 

      The German Right was becoming defined by their rhetoric, which was expanding into a more radical plain by 1890. They began advocating lower and middle class interests, which was a completely progressive concept, but their public agendas were defined by “rhetorical excess and dishonesty”. Party leaders no longer appeared apathetic and far from the spotlight of politics, as they grew “startlingly demagogic” and “offered panaceas which they often knew were bogus”. These qualities directly fit into the make up of Hitler’s aura. His oratorical reputation for playing on people’s fears and emotions was defined by very similar features, such as his offering of solutions in defining and removing scapegoats. His championing of the German people in speech, despite his actions of extracting rights and installing himself as dictator. Similarities can even be drawn between the faux-socialist programs under Bismarck, and the policies of Nazi Germany. It is the same principal: Give back to the people in the form of Government programs to win them over from the Communist parties, yet take away their rights by establishing an Authoritative government. It is certain that a correlation between the politics of German Conservatism and Nazi Fascism exist, but to a degree that supports a conclusion in line with the Sonderweg theory? One can hardly fathom the likelihood of the Nazi Regime’s eminence, yet the trends set by the German Right by 1890 make for a rather suitable entrance for Totalitarianism. Had Hitler been born in any other European Nation, his chance of success would look dismal, yet it is still hard to believe that Germany couldn’t have swayed in a different direction by the early 20th century. 

        Can the relevance of racial hierarchy be rooted in the German tradition of Prussian superiority? We can affirm this hypothesis by assuming that this case emphasized the importance of one’s heritage in the German nation. Unlike most other nations in Europe at the time, with the possible exception of Austro-Hungary and Belgium, the German Empire was domineered by a specific ethnic-sect of Germans. Although physical differences between all German’s were extremely limited, cultural differences were noteworthy. Prussian culture was excessively militaristic in comparison with the other states of Germany, and their economic supremacy can be linked to a penchant for diligent proficiency. It is then relevant to say that this Prussian cult of tenacity played a major role in developing the nation’s racial mindset. In other words, this 19th century ethnocentrism may have generated the essence of barbaric nationalism, as well as the ideology of Germanic supremacy within the Third Reich. With such a vigorous perception of the German culture, propagators of this hierarchical concept brought in the ideas of nation and blood. As Retallack points out, a number of radical conservative sects were gaining momentum by the 1890’s, often stressing a fear of ethnic pollution to the public. Whether this paranoia was authentic is not entirely known, but because of the continual struggle for mass support, the Conservatives often used popular scares like this to their advantage. The traditional beliefs of Prussian supremacy undoubtedly influenced the defense of German purity, but this notion’s demagogic embellishment by the German Right is what created its radical element. A sense of national identity was still somewhat of a new concept in Europe, yet these Conservatives were able to quickly embed it with an element of extremity. By linking the ideas of ethnicity with German Nationalism, Hitler’s rhetoric of racial superiority was not an innovative German supposition. What was original about Hitler’s take on this subject, was his more than probable faith in its accuracy. Anti-Semitism and the fear of Jewish infiltration were very real prejudices throughout German History, but the Nazi’s hate fueled speech was far more sincere than that of the Old Right. Retallack notes that the Conservatives of Imperial Germany were very desperate for popular support from the lower classes. Their tradition of elitism and defending the power of the Junkers is an obvious indication of this. As mentioned before, they did not refrain from promoting falsehoods in their political platforms, often creating various threats from the artificial Jewish menace. Although one would consider this purely racist, the 19th century Conservatives were merely using hatred to align the German population with their party. There is no doubt that Hitler did the very same thing to gain political momentum, but the almost immeasurable amount of violence the Nazis carried out corresponded in no way with the actions of the Conservative movement. From analyzing passages in Mein Kampf, Hitler alludes to the mixing of races within a single ethnic state as “the sole cause of the dying out of old cultures”. The influence of the Old Right’s discourse is more than apparent in this statement, leading one to conclude the role of these innately Conservative principles in Hitler’s racial theories. Nonetheless, violence or action of any kind was never carried out by the German Conservative parties. Therefore, the Nazi’s dedication to these ideologies was exponentially larger, which is justified by the intensity of their actions. Because of this, the actual bloodshed carried out by the Nazi Regime cannot be substantially linked to an indigenous precept of German Conservatism; far more authority over these atrocities was due to the tumultuous condition of humanity in post-war Europe. 

       Decades after the Sonderweg theory had gained prominence, a British historian named Ian Kershaw was publishing works on the Third Reich with an alternative, yet profound viewpoint. Kershaw emphasizes the role of World War I in helping instigate the Nazi monstrosity, and he convincingly does so with two crucial points. His first point revolves around the fact that the First World War was a disastrously innovative event that irreversibly changed the decorum of armed conflict. The Great War set a tone of profound bellicosity across the entire continent, and to some extent the entire world. Every European still alive following the tragedy had witnessed the extent of human capability in carrying out destruction. The relevance of this extremely violent disposition was that it established a readiness to resort to the utmost amount of bloodshed, and it’s success in achieving political goals. The brutality in Hitler’s words and his agenda were more easily accepted by the public, in part from the first World War’s so called “breaking of the ice” in terms of it’s widespread carnage. Another interesting thought on this is the relationship between appeasement and the bar of violence that this war set. The ridiculous amount of leeway that Nazi Germany was given preceding World War II, in reference to their unrequited annexation of other nations’ land, was because of the tangible fear that Hitler was completely willing to use maximum force. Perhaps the lengths to which Hitler’s onslaught would eventually reach is in part due to the easiness in attaining his first, and far more civil, political desires. In regards to Nazism’s magnitude of force and the anecdotes just mentioned, any recognition of German Conservatism was uninhabitable within these theories. For the argument of this paper does not claim that the German Right influenced every aspect of Hitler’s extent. The function of The Great War, along with the results for Germany in its aftermath, are undeniable factors in both the prosperity of the Nazi Party and the scope of its vivacity. German Conservatism can, however, indirectly relate to these angles, particularly in its paranoid and militaristic culture having enabled war in the first place. Nevertheless, World War I is much to great a component in generating Hitler’s ascendancy, therefore one can never certify the Nazification of Germany solely based on the inherent radicalism of German Conservatism. The Great War’s precedence amid this sentiment can be further comprehended with Kershaw’s second indication.

       Kershaw’s other assertion is the complete embarrassment that World War I (most notably the terms of the Versailles treaty) caused for the German population, which placed their national mindset in a state of resentful degradation. The mortifying circumstances in Germany following The Great War has been widely acknowledged, yet this situation must also be considered within the context of Nazification. In order to do so, one must comprehend the great lengths of both physical damage and political abuse that Germany endured, thus digesting Kershaw’s logic. It’s easier to grasp this concept when Kershaw depicts the highly advanced nature of Germany’s military and industrial might preceding the war. This was not a nation that had countless times throughout history been subdued to the mercy of its enemies. This was a state that, 40 years prior to World War I, had militarily dominated vast empires within months, and only had a record of benefiting from warfare. The fact that they not only lost World War I, but also were completely humiliated from astronomical War debts and territorial losses, debilitated the German ego to a point of complete desperation. Anything or anyone that would come to the forefront of German politics, no matter how fanatical, had a chance of winning over the German people following the Great War. Although the inception of the Nazi Party, but more precisely its excessive radicalism, was influenced by the verbosity of Imperial Conservatism, one cannot ignore the bearing that World War I had on these events. For it was the despondence of the German people following this war that not only implemented a need to avenge their reputation, but even a premature longing for retaliation. Their self-esteem was crushed, leading enough of the population to succumb to such radicalism as the Nazi Regime. 

        Although revengeance was a vague principal of Fascism across Europe, it is worthy to note that “No other Fascist state had the depth of Germany’s redemptive quality”. Even when considering the relevance of forceful expansion within Communism, the Soviet Union’s bout against the Capitalist world was trivial in comparison with the Nazi endeavor. Sure, the U.S.S.R. acquired most of Eastern Europe following World War II, but it was practically handed to them by the Allied Powers. Franco’s Spain failed to involve itself once in these types of motives, and Fascist Italy was so ineffectual, it became the only European nation to loose a war in Africa. Why were other radical dictatorships so unimpressive when it came to efficiency and expansion? Because revolutionary regimes typically rise to power in nations that have suffering economies and populations. Another key aspect of these tumultuous states is that they have weak and dissatisfied militaries. In fact, a key reason in why radical political change has been possible, be it in Cuba, Bolshevik Russia, and even pre-Fascist Italy, is because of their militaries’ change of allegiance towards the revolutionary party. Why is this relevant to the power of the Nazi Regime? Because unlike these other nations mentioned, Germany had been a leading world power since it’s onset. 

       The conditions of Germany in the early 20th century were highly impressive, with the nation possibly having the strongest military in Europe, as well as an industrial economy that was arguably the most modernized. These aspects made it possible for the Nazi regime, with its irregular goals of violent domination, to flourish in comparison with other revolutionary nations. The Prussian values of diligence and efficiency gave Germany this illustrious economic power. Along with Industrial might, the backbone of Prussian dominance was it’s staunch militarism. With Germany having a deep-rooted history of militaristic supremacy, Hitler gained command over an alarmingly impressive military when he rose to power. Unlike tyrants such as Stalin, Franco, and Mussolini, Adolf Hitler truly had the capability of sending shock waves throughout Europe, and carry out the annexation of half the continent. From having a national prestige for science and technology, Nazi Germany had an elevated state of weaponry over its enemies. Another vital factor was the industrial resources that the Third Reich had at their disposal. Hitler would have never of gotten as close as he did to Continental domination without the vast amount of materials required for such an effort. However, the abundance of industrial capability available to him, although ultimately not an indicating factor for a Nazi Victory, still provided the German people a sense of faith in a war-mongering leader. In other words, Germany’s Industrial strength and militaristic prowess did not ensure Hitler’s subjugation of Europe, but because these features of Germany played a role in Hitler’s ascendancy, they are in part responsible for the extent of damage committed by the Nazi Regime. If these attributes of Germany led it’s populous to throw support into Nazism, then they must have also been pivotal in Hitler’s self confidence, therefore justifying his conviction in attaining such extreme conquests. These ideas behind Germany’s various forms of national potency clearly indicate the Regime’s ability in exerting such brute force, as well as the ease in which the Nazi’s amassed indigenous acceptance. How then, do the traditional German Right’s unyielding politics of the Imperial period relate in any way? Because the roots of Nazi Germany’s mechanism for capacity, in relationship to Germany’s history of self-maximization in the preceding concepts, lie directly in the innately Conservative basis of Prussian institution.  

        Consider for instance the arms race that developed primarily between Prussia and Great Britain. Although this harmonious build up muscle emerged in several European nations, it largely began with the mounting intimidation of Prussia’s militaristic institution. Along with the nation’s amplified war credentials, these attributes of the newly Germanic state were directly consequential of its aggressive political stature. On these grounds, the Empire’s unparalleled degree of Conservatism made it responsible for, not only the lingering threat of political imbalance, but also dismantling the Continent’s environment of limited hostility. 

         Despite the abundance of information in defense of Germany’s superiority on the continent, why did this advanced state eventually find itself in the grip of a radical dictator? Germany fit within the prevailing ranks of its Western European constituents, yet it’s political course went in the opposite direction of any other World power. Germany having been on the loosing side of cataclysmic war is an essential basis, yet an equally apparent factor can once again be found in the history of German Conservatism. In the present we are well aware that modernity has ensued along Democratic lines, thus 19th century Conservatism warranted the failure of political sovereignty for Germany. Can an accelerated military and economy alone not promise security and political composure for a given nation? From looking at the various states that failed to embrace liberty and constitutional democracy by the 20th century, it is easy to proclaim that these values are necessary for a nation to prosper in modernity. Therefore, since traditional Conservatism dominated its governmental ideology, the Imperial German state was inherently reluctant to politically accommodate its people. This aversion for political compensation can be defined by the nation’s lack of liberal values, along with the excessive and deceitful Authoritarianism that exemplified it’s Bismarckian system of rule. Despite its populist discourse, the German Right was intrinsically rooted in a foundation of dogmatic qualities, which only the likes of totalitarian regimes could relate to past the dawn of modernity. From this, one can believe that this staunch Conservatism, although having forged the nation’s economic and military preeminence, also helped determine a grim forecast for the state of German politics. For it was this brand of Conservatism that heavily imposed Germany’s fate, and unlike the rest of the prevailing nations of the 19th century, emancipation remained out of the people’s reach. Germany, in every sense of the word, was in the palm of the Right Wing’s hand throughout the period of European Democratization. Thus from closely examining the tyrannical nature of German Conservatism, it’s certifiable that the political Right not only pulled their country from under the Western blanket of Democratic modernity, but also encouraged Germany’s inability to achieve political temperance in the future. 

         The Conservatives that controlled Germany’s political realm believed that their nation deserved a more honorable reputation; they aggressively promoted the Weltpolitik philosophy, which stated that Germany deserved global preeminence, and was even willing to use force to achieve this notoriety. With the rise of Socialism following the 1848 revolutions, the Conservative apparatus also promoted a stronger threat of Bolshevism within Germany than what actually existed. They truly valued the condition of German culture, although by imperious means of crediting themselves with its promotion and preservation. It is then unsurprising that this Right Wing establishment viewed their own nation as the last bulwark in the defense of Western Civilization. There was an obvious element of exaggerated projections that verified their radical tendencies. In addition, German Conservatism’s disposition of paranoia and insecurity can attest to its individuality, and thoroughly reveal the severity of its desired authority. Nonetheless, it’s entirely possible that these Conservative groups were in no way fearful of national stagnation, nor afraid of the infiltration of State control by alternative political ideologies from their own. For the German Right’s doctrine by the end of the 1890’s was heavily comprised of fraudulent notions, in concurrence with their misleading Authoritative conduct. Take for instance the idea that these Conservatives had one goal in mind when it came to their domestic image: They were utterly concerned with being responsive to the masses, without having to be responsible for the people. This political dishonesty was exasperated by the more radical “New” Right, who emerged just prior to the turn of the century. They promoted fabrications of Germany’s ill-fated future, which had at some point become analogous with Nation’s culture of negativity.  

         If one word could describe the consciousness of the Imperial German Right, it would be pessimism. Why was it that pessimism dominated the ideals of Conservatism during this time period, and why was it exacerbated under the Nazi’s? One may be able to contemplate this occurrence in Nazi Germany, for the nation was in a dire state of affairs, but for what reasons were the politics of 19th Century Conservatism so deceivingly morose for Germany? Also, is it evident that this dogma of cynicism, which was exceedingly promoted in the hyperbole of German Conservatism, has any bearing on a possibly detached German acceptance for abuse? First one must verify whether pessimism is actually prevalent within German politics and culture, thus suggesting that this alleged claim could be a logical reflection. What is more decisive in this inquiry is confirming the leverage of Authoritative politics in encouraging a German culture of despair and submission. One can easily demonstrate pessimism’s cultural engagement, as Kershaw has done, by shedding light on the intrinsic fatalism found within German philosophy. Kershaw also declares in his article that there was indeed a profound sentiment of pessimism in the thick of public ethos, although its inclusion among the conjectures of Germany’s Intelligentsia is obviously far more visible. Following the interpretation of these specific German notables, an even further discovery of this sardonic personality can be sustained throughout German culture.

       According to Kershaw’s article, a German historian named Oswald Spengler was an imperative source in foreboding extreme political upheaval in Europe. Spengler released a set of volumes entitled The Decline Of The West, which would achieve far-reaching success following the First World War. This particular work of his was hugely popular amongst German elites and commoners alike, eventually finding it’s way into the tenets of multiple patriotic organizations. What is far more compelling is Kershaw’s deeper reading of these nationalist coalitions, who interestingly adopted Spengler’s dismal philosophy, which was similar to that of the Nazi’s rhetoric, even though these groups preceded the 20th century. In consequence, one can verify the far reaching attitude of looming collapse in German history, not only paired with a penchant for radical nationalism, but also grounds for a genuinely pessimistic demeanor within actual German citizens. Perhaps this remarkable foreshadowing of the nation’s overhanging abolition, with special attention towards the similarity of nationalist priority and justification, may suggest some kind of self initiated liability for Germany’s own downfall. Is it just a mere coincidence that pro-nationalist sects within the Empire’s population, in addition to the correspondence in language maintained by German Conservatism, both proclaimed anxieties not unlike those within the Nazi platform of the following century? Ironically, it would be the synthesis of Nazism itself which would hold responsibility for Germany’s eventual destruction following World War II, yet in it’s credence, the regime believed in itself as the emancipator of Germanic vulnerability towards some sort of impending doom.  How can one then imagine that, despite the parallelism between 19th century cynical phobias and the radical mindset of Nazi Germany, Hitler’s regime was void of influence from Germany’s history of political irrationality? This language that professed the uncertainty of the nation’s future welfare, which was relied upon from the more radical “New “ Right of Imperial Germany, was imitated by Hitler during his rise to prominence. The discomfort of these conservative expressions fit the narrative of the Nazi Agenda, further advocating Hitler’s Anti-Semitism, evoking concern over the purity of German ethnic culture, and implementing himself as the nation’s much needed Authoritative leader. This particular kinship is irrefutable, though the imminence of such radical violence and tyrannical oppression within Nazist extremity was in no way a perfect match with the preceding enterprise of Imperial Conservatism. Despite this, Imperial Germany’s deflection of the more coherent ideals of Western Europe guaranteed unsavory political conditions at some point for the Nation’s posterity.         

         Friedrich Nietzsche, possibly one the most prominent German thinkers due to being the sole architect of Nihilism, falls into congruence with the assertion of German culture’s underlying troubled character. For Nihilism is not built upon a philosophy of misery, but nor was Imperial Germany. It is Nihilism’s indifference towards finding meaning in life that could distantly related to the lack of morality of Nazi Germany. In fact, Nihilism argues that there is no validity to human morality, for no one person can certify that their set of morals is superior to any other person. The relevance of Nietzsche and his doctrine has nothing to with the similarities between Hitler’s philosophy and Nihilist theory. The reason for acknowledging Nietzsche is simply because he hails from Germany. It is noteworthy that a single nation bore these two very unconventional philosophies, thus supplying evidence that the roots of German culture may have an abnormal, nearly vile, disregard for humanistic altruism and the inborn right of self-determination. One cannot make such a generalization of a particular culture based on two of it’s most famous theorists, however, their shared vacancy for honoring human life, along with a failure to recognize the ethicality of freewill, encourages a Germanic propensity towards oppression. It can only be concluded that Germany’s proclivity for Authoritarianism truly shaped a culture that was deprived of inpunitive expectations. It seems like only a nation that omitted any chance of seizing liberty, regardless of an artificially inflated sense of social progression akin to Imperial Germany, could birth such acrimonious philosophies such as those above. Is it then true that German culture instilled in its population a hopelessness that allowed for an indifference towards oppression?

           If Immanuel Kant’s points are taken into consideration, than not only is this so, but an indifference towards oppression was accompanied by an instinctive restraint for obedience. In 1797, Immanuel Kant took on the potentially submissive essence of German rule, stating that Germans were overtly obedient for a civilized group of people. In fact, Kant expressed that the Germans were the most obedient population that existed, and this was so because of their desire for order over venturing through the political unknown. Even in 1797, Kant observed the exceptionally German quality of submission, noting their apathy, even readiness, in succumbing to Despotism. Following these assertions, one can honorably defend the perfection of Germany’s social climate for any kind of abusive regime to erect jurisdiction. However, is the population’s inclination towards submission an undeniable attribute of German culture? Whether this pretension is sound or not, the obedient quality of the German people can logically be derived from their nation’s long standing political archaism, together with the population’s vast exposure to the authoritative quality of Conservative Germany.

          The most vital factor of pre-Fascist German culture, in terms of linking the ideologies throughout German history with those of the Nazi Regime, is the Populist front known as the Volkisch movement. With its origins in 19th century Nationalism, the Volkisch movement signified many ideals of Conservative patriotism, which would later be almost entirely adopted by Hitler for his Political doctrine. Such mainstays of both Nazism and traditional German political values can be also be found in Volkhisch, such as radical concepts of Germanic supremacy, romanticized populism, and especially during it’s first years, conservative Prussian orthodoxy. It established philosophical enemies very early on during the German Empire’s inception, and because of the impassioned state of radical convictions during this time of national unity, the movement’s ideological and political axiom had an immediate cadence of German ethnicity. Volkhisch found theoretical opposition in Communism, Capitalism, Liberalism, as well as Parliamentarian governance in its onset, and beyond contending these principals; the movement also endorsed an individualistic brand of Anti-Semitism. Unlike the vast prevalence of Anti-Semitism throughout Europe’s history, the Volkhisch movement had a distinct exclusionary aspect of its desire in removing the Jewish problem. The interpretation of this discretion can be rather vague, albeit the movement’s known ambition for a singly ethnic German state. This particular take on Anti-Semitism was acutely similar to Hitler’s ethnological rhetoric, which early in its induction was ambiguous as well. In terms of the actions that were implemented under Anti-Semitic Nazi policy, consider the contrast between the enigmatic quality of Hitler’s premature racial discourse, and the almost immeasurable extent of the hate-fueled carnage that was actually carried out by the Third Reich. Because the amplitude of Nazi genocide was never explicitly addressed in Hitler’s platform, it is plausible that the Volkhisch Movement, having had a similar obscurity within its proclaimed racial desires, possessed an extremity of intention as well. This is a more conceivable argument when the radical evolution of the movement following World War I gives an increased feeling extremism and mass politics of the younger generation. From the onset of the Weimar Republic, Volkhisch transformed as a large number of middle class students joined its ranks. This newly added element of youth was accompanied with an increased devotion for national regeneration, paired with an even more racially centered definition of Nationalism. These changes increased the consolidation of the movement, but Volkhisch still lacked the ability to attract the masses. Although their language was increasingly Nationalist in objectivity, Hitler saw the movement’s inability to win the German people over resting in the absence of a tangible uniting cause. In Mein Kampf, the Fuhrer stressed specific national convictions in attaining power, claiming that his own political narrative would be able to consolidate the German people. What Volkhisch lacked in Hitler’s eyes was the dogmatic outcries found in German Conservatism, however the Old right failed to achieve a Populist following as well. 

          From understanding the Volkhisch capacity for populist sentiments and radically ethnic Nationalism, the familiarities between the preceding movement and Nazism are far greater than any other ideology, political party, or cultural aspect, of pre-Fascist Germany. When examining the political conditions that influenced the authoritative climate of Hitler’s ascendency, a tangible certification that the avidity of the Volkhisch movement foreshadowed a consistent disposition in Nazist ideology. In fact, the correlation between the two movements can attest that Volkhisch was a theoretical miscarriage in terms of an extremist political movement of ethnically driven nationalistic character, due to the undeniable manifestation of a politically comparable front destined for Germany’s future. 

In a return to the concept of individualism in defining the anti-Semitic history of Germany, an importance can at least be stressed on this impression and the lengths of decimation that Nazi Germany undertook. Because the absolute factor of Hitler’s extremism was his execution of the Holocaust, one can say that it is then the defining aspect of German Fascism in terms of it’s absolute immortality in comparison other regimes that have been designated an inhumane reputation. The fact in question is whether this unrivaled depravity of anti-Semitism was the distinct product of Hitler’s ideology, or if it stemmed from a congenital nature of Germanic bigotry. This is crucial in determining whether the particular design of Nazi Germany was a conceivable destiny, and considering that the Holocaust was what mainly construed the Regime’s unsurpassed brutality, the affirmation of an ingrained lethality of Judaic contempt may conclude the predetermined likes of Nazism in Germany’s prospect. In determining the origins of Germanic anti-Semitism, Political Scientist Daniel Goldhagen has stated a controversial, yet supposedly evidence based, theory about the actual Germans who carried out the extermination process with their own hands. Goldhagen suggests that these executioners were willing in their murderous actions, but what was the source of their inclination? It did not manifest from a cultural obedience that caused these men to adopt a Nazi fanaticism, but Goldhagen argues that the consent of slaughter was rooted in centuries of a German culture, which encouraged a murderous sentiment for the Jewish problem. From an apparent deep examination of German cultural history, Goldhagen states that a formal execution policy was promoted in Germany since the 1800’s, which was a much higher degree of Jewish hatred than had existed in any other European nation. However, Richard Evans has detested many of Golhagen’s claims as outlandish and sensationalist. In fact, from his research surrounding the German working class, Evans found a complete absence of anti-Semitism within the German labor movement. Other theorists have linked Germany’s early glorification on Social Darwinism, which was surely inspired by the Nationalist emphasis on Germanic supremacy, to have considerate weight in the Nazi’s determination of mass murder in comparison to other Totalitarian Regimes. As it is well known, Evan’s points out the unique enthusiasm Imperial German culture had for sterilization programs and the Eugenics movement. There could easily be a connection between these German campaigns inspired by racial theory, and the eventual policies of the Nazi Regime. Despite the dozens of arguments for German Conservative politics in relation to the condition of future Radicalism, the Eugenics movement and the practice of sterilization, was actually unrelated to the German Right at this point in time. Evans claims that these Social Darwinist practices were most supported by the Liberal Democrats, and other parties from the German Left Wing. More often than not, one can find the concepts that Traditional Conservatism possessed exude a foreshadowing temperament of turbulence and radical despotism. In this example however, it become apparent that there were of course sources for Fascist inspiration in other sects of German history, as well as completely original elements represented in Nazi Germany. Despite this, the argument for German Conservatism’s dominance in the influence over future extremism remains quite durable. 

         Yet to be a scrutinized, despite an elevated consideration over any previous arguments, is Otto Von Bismarck, the unprecedented personification of Germanic Conservatism himself. In all honesty, Bismarck the man has little relevance in the vicinity of this debate, but there is much more to him than the actual mortal being. The emphatic genius of his authoritarian nature, arguably still unrivaled to this day, conclusively set the tone for Conservatism’s predominance over the German nation for many decades after his death. Therefore, his significance in ensuring the autocratic command of German politics, amidst Europe’ storm of ardent revolution and inescapable demands for liberty, left Germany at the forefront of traditional conservative values the like of which had mostly departed the Western World. Despite his tenacious effort to preserve power for the Right Wing Prussian elite, it was his failure to abandon this outdated tyrannical complex that gave way to the submissive compliance for radical tendencies of his nation’s future.

           The Totalitarian imagination of Germany’s legislative system, which not only derived the Prussian-centric roots of ethnic nationalism, but also restricted the future deviation of Conservative design, exemplified in Bismarck the arbitrary substance that persevered until the Third Reich. One may not presently visualize any of Hitler’s theoretical elements within that of the Iron Chancellor, yet the cloak of Nazi Ideology prominently donned the stature of Bismarckian Conservatism. Whether or not there is legitimacy to this comparison, the affinity between both autocrats was as spontaneous as it was a reality, burgeoning from Hitler’s unrestrained finesse and national invigoration. Both men possessed an ambience of mental and verbal dexterity, inciting the people with a Germanic concernment for national impetus, along with self-victimization. There existed a cult of Bismarck up until the Third Reich, but during the Weimar Period, the group’s members propelled a common desire for a return to Traditional Germanic conservatism. In a way, Bismarck represented solutions to the Germans who were dissatisfied in the young and dysfunctional Democracy. Many were becoming desperate for change, therefore Hitler’s affirmation by the German people was somewhat spontaneous, which Frankel argues as why someone as Radical Hitler was accepted in the first place.  In addition, the fact that the Bismarck supporters adapted so fast to the newly established fixation for Hitler, is enough evidence, Frankel claims, to believe that Bismarck laid ground for oncoming obsessions with powerful individuals in German politics. This observation is noteworthy, although the fact that Bismarck created the system that serves as the basis for German political abnormality, makes one think if Bismarck’s cult of personality did in fact create a Germanic desire to put faith into a national leader. This need for the proclamation of strong national representatives, likely related to the ethnic based nationalism and German Superiority construct, is possibly related to the want of Germanic dominion of Europe over its rival nations. Hindenburg as well possessed an embellished reputation as a national savior during World War I, which Richard Evans alludes to as being the inborn German desire, which implanted the devotion in Hitler to create the Ubermensch theory. This component of the population’s mindset, defined by a perception of a supreme individual representing ethnic German transcendence, was initiated with eternal worship of Bismarck. This notion, which was mobilized by the Chancellor’s authoritative regulation of cultural obedience, undoubtedly contributed to the symptom of ethnocentricity within the identity of German Nationalism. 

         The essence of radicalization became instilled in the post-war national psyche, which permitted a positive reception of Hitler by the German people, as well as the premise of extremism within his paradigm. This is one of the many junctions between Conservative jurisdiction, having instilled the acceptance for radicalism and Authoritative conformity, along with the abstraction of a solid framework for eventual political antagonism. Despite this conception, full responsibility over Nazi ascendency is by no means held in the actions of Germanic Authoritarianism, given that other sources of influence assisted the specificity of events. Nonetheless, these other components that guided the progression towards such a dire outcome, were arguably constructions of the same rigid environment of ironhanded politics. This notion makes for a definite complexity to the subject, but when Imperial Conservatism is explored with a suspicion of historical liability, an undeniable relevance cannot be overlooked. Can one proclaim that German politics, having furnished obedience for extremist autocracy and a basis of ethnic supremacy in radical nationalism, consecrated the unavoidable depth in which the nation would politically descend? It is apparent that Imperial trends of legislation not only induced a climate for dogmatic radicalism, but also directly influenced the principals of Adolf Hitler, yet one can still find hope that the Nazi Abomination was not an inevitable and solitary consequence of internal origin. Hitler’s regime was made a reality under the circumstances established by Imperial Germany, but can one not conclude that Hitler himself was the source of heinous ingenuity? For the doctrine of Nazism was completely original in it’s level of extremity, and perhaps the political destiny of Germany was slanted in an upwards slope of radical cataclysm, but it is only probable that the scope of Nazi desire and it’s idiosyncrasies were indeed a sole product of Hitler himself. German Fascism was inescapable from the inspiration of Authoritarian disdain, for which the German empire failed to progress from it’s politically antiquated system of fervent Conservatism. This Imperial state doctrine suspended the German acquirement of Democracy, thus arousing the failure of the Weimar Republic, and the contention of national turmoil. Hitler, by chance, rose supreme, and the unimaginable events of the 20^th century took place. Instigated by the true perfection of Germany’s political domain for such an incident as the rise of Nazi Fascism. 

Retallack, James. The German Right 1860-1920 Political Limits Of The Authoritarian Imagination,Toronto, Canada: University Of Toronto Press, 2005.

Frankel, Richard E. Bismarck’s Shadow:The Cult of Leadership and the Transformation of the German Right. 1898–1945, Oxford: Berg, 2005.

Evans, Richard. Rereading German History: From Unification to Reunification, 1800-1996. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.

Evans, Richard. The Coming of the Third Reich. New York:Penguin Books, 2003.

Goldhagen, Daniel J. Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Knopf, 1996.

Hitler, Adolf, Translated by Ralph Manheim. Mein Kampf. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971.

Kershaw, Ian. “Hitler and the Uniqueness of Nazism.” Journal of comtemporary History 39:2 (April 2004).